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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, provides a forum for the binding settlement
of international legal disputes. Its authority, however, is not limited
to the formal adjudication of legal rights and obligations. As with
the Permanent Court, the present tribunal can also exercise a quasi-
conciliatory function. Where a conflict between states is intractable
or touches their vital interests, the parties may not desire settlement
through binding adjudication. They may agree that the Court
should establish a juridical framework which provides the founda-
tions of a new legal relationship whose detail will be determined in
subsequent negotiations. For example, in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases' the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and
the Netherlands submitted to the Court a dispute concerning the
proper delimitation, as between them, of the Continental Shelf in
the North Sea. In the submission, the parties requested the Court
to decide what principles and rules of international law were applic-
able to the delimitation and undertook to delimit the shelf by subse-
quent agreement in pursuance of the requested decision. The Court
enumerated legal and equitable principles relevant to the shelf re-
gime and specified geographic and geological factors which the par-
ties should take into account in the course of negotiations. Following
the decision, the parties reached a negotiated settlement.2
The exercise of judicial authority as part of a broader process of
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.S., College of the Holy Cross,
1954; J.D., Boston College, 1957; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1962.
'[1969] I.C.J. 3. Compare Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savory and the District of
Gex, [19301 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 24. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, pt. IV, ch. XVI, § 36 (1966). This procedure should be
distinguished from the power of the Court under article 38, para. 2 of its Statute to decide a
case ex aequo et bono if the parties should agree. This power is better described as quasi-
legislative, since it empowers the Court to disregard existing positive law and establish a new
legal relationship between the parties. The authorization makes possible a decision based
upon what is fair and just. Sohn, Arbitration of International Disputes Ex aequo et bono, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 330 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the International Court held that it was not acting
under article 38(2). [19691 I.C.J. 3, 48.
2 Agreements Delimiting the Continental Shelf in the North Sea, done at Copenhagen,
January 28, 1971, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 600 (1971).
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peaceful settlement is desirable as long as states are reluctant to
submit vital disputes to plenary adjudication. Partial acceptance of
the Court's authority is a welcome step towards the orderly resolu-
tion of serious controversies, particularly when the opinion of the
Court forms an integral, although incomplete, aspect of the final
settlement. Moreover, many modern controversies are not amenable
to complete resolution by traditional forms of adjudication. While
certain general principles may be applicable, the existing body of
customary rules often will not encompass the entire controversy.
The matters in contention can be so generally controversial that
state practice has not crystallized or, given the novelty of the mat-
ters at issue, there have not been sufficient opportunities for new
rules to develop.
Where the parties involved in a controversy call upon the Court
to assist them in their efforts to resolve their differences, the
Court's participation, although limited, constitutes an important
contribution to the pacific objectives of the Charter. But where the
consensual basis is absent, or doubtful, the proper coordination of
judicial activity with other forms of peaceful settlement becomes
more difficult. In a series of recent cases, the respondent state has
challenged the Court's jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the
Court has assumed a quasi-conciliatory posture. In exercising its
authority in spite of such objections, the Court has viewed its role
as that of a contributor to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Yet
in so doing it may also have compromised some of its authority as
a judicial organ. The paradigm case in this line of development is
the fisheries controversy which arose out of the extension of the
Icelandic fisheries zone.
By applications filed in April and June of 1972, the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings
in the International Court against the Republic of Iceland. Both
Applicants asked the Court to declare that Iceland's claim to extend
its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a zone of 50 nautical miles
around Iceland was without foundation in international law. The
Court's jurisdiction was based upon exchanges of notes between
Iceland and Great Britain and Iceland and Germany which pro-
vided, with respect to disputes arising from the extension of Icelan-
dic fishery jurisdiction, that "the matter shall, at the request of
either party, be referred to the International Court of Justice."'
I Fisheries Jurisdiction, Interim Protection Order (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972]
I.C.J. 12, 16; (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30, 33.
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Iceland was promptly notified of the applications but refused to
participate in the proceedings. It took the position that there was
no basis for jurisdiction under the Statute of the Court, that the
exchanges of notes were not of a permanent character, and that their
purpose had been achieved. Unwilling to confer jurisdiction upon
the Court because of the vital interests at stake, it notified the
Registrar that it would not appoint an agent to represent it in the
proceedings.
On August 17, 1972, the Court granted the Applicant's requests
for interim measures of protection.' The interim orders provided,
inter alia, that none of the parties should take any action which
would aggravate the situation or which might prejudice rights which
may be established by the Court's decision on the merits. Iceland
was specifically prohibited from enforcing regulations purporting to
extend its fisheries jurisdiction beyond a 12 mile limit, and restric-
tions were placed upon the annual metric tonnage of fish taken from
the disputed area by ships registered in the United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany. By an order of August 18, 1972, 5
the Court decided by a 9-6 vote that the first pleadings should
address the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. It set Octo-
ber 13 as the time limit for the Memorials of the Applicants, and
December 8 as the time limit for the Counter-Memorials of Iceland.
On February 2, 1973, the Court entered its decision in both cases
on its jurisdictional competence! Jurisdiction was founded upon the
separate exchanges of notes between Iceland and the two Appli-
cants. While Iceland remained unrepresented, the Court was careful
to weigh its argument, based upon the principle of changed circum-
stances, that the consent expressed in the exchanges of notes was
no longer operative. The Court then fixed time limits for the filing
of written proceedings on the merits.7 At the request of the Appli-
cants, the Court on July 12, 1973, confirmed the interim orders of
protection. It took note of the fact that negotiations were taking
place between the states concerned, with a view to reaching an
interim arrangement pending final settlement of the dispute.
Throughout the proceedings Iceland maintained its position that
the Court did not possess competence to entertain the fisheries dis-
putes. It filed no pleadings and did not appear before the Court at
[1972] I.C.J. 12; [1972] I.C.J. 30.
[1972] I.C.J. 181; [1972] I.C.J. 188.
6 [1973] I.C.J. 3; [1973] I.C.J. 49.
Order of Feb. 15, 1973, [1973] I.C.J. 93; [1973] I.C.J. 96.
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the public hearings.
Counsel for the Applicants having invoked article 53 of the Stat-
ute,' the Court proceeded to judgments on the merits. It was en-
tered, in both cases, on July 25, 1974.1 Noting that it has acted "with
particular circumspection" because of the nonappearance of the
respondent state and taking note of interim agreements between the
parties, the Court adjudged that the unilateral extension by Iceland
of exclusive fishing rights to 50 nautical miles was unlawful under
international law and not opposable by either of the Applicants.
While acknowledging the concept of preferential rights of a coastal
state, the Court held that they cannot extinguish concurrent rights
of states, such as the Applicants, whose fishing industries have
fished in the disputed area for a considerable period. In its judg-
ment, the Court held that the parties are under mutual obligations
to undertake negotiations, in good faith, for the equitable resolution
of their differences and specified factors which the parties were
obliged to take into account. 0
The decisions of the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Cases are controversial. In spite of the respondent
state's refusal to recognize its authority, the Court nevertheless as-
sumed jurisdiction, issued interim orders of protection, confirmed
those orders, and reached a decision on the merits of the underlying
controversy. Further, it directed the parties to negotiate a final
settlement of their differences. The decisions contrast markedly
with the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where the Court's in-
volvement in the dispute settlement process was sustained by the
consent of the parties.
The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases raise issues of institutional com-
petence which can be best understood if these decisions are seen as
part of a general tendency of the Court to increase its participation
in the settlement of international disputes. By deciding that the
Article 53 provides as follows:
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to
defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favor of its
claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdic-
tion in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded
in fact and law.
I.C.J. STATUTE art. 53.
o Fisheries Jurisdiction, Merits, Judgments (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J.
3; (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175.
" (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [19741 I.C.J. 3, paras. 73-78 [further references to the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases will be to this decision].
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parties were under mutual obligations to undertake good faith nego-
tiations, the Court was open to the general charge that by so doing
it exceeded its institutional authority. In contentious cases the
Court is bound to adjudge, a limited role which is underlined by the
language of article 53 of its Statute." Where the respondent state
does not consent to the Court's jurisdiction, it is arguable that once
it is satisified of its jurisdiction the Court can do no more than
address itself to the merits of the dispute. The validity of the chal-
lenged action must be determined on the basis of international law.
The Court, according to this view, does not possess any general
authority to promote the pacific settlement of disputes. 
2
But while the Court does not have a general license to involve
itself in international controversies, it does possess some authority,
as a principal organ of the United Nations, to promote the peaceful
settlement of disputes. It should seek to assure respect for the gen-
eral principle that grave international controversies should be set-
tled, and that their settlement should be by peaceful means. The
extent to which the International Court should seek to influence the
resolution of particular disputes in which one party resists its au-
thority cannot be determined a priori according to an exact formula.
It depends rather upon a careful evaluation of complex factors
which, in combination, constitute its institutional authority. An
examination of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, and others of a
similar genre of which the Court has recently been seized, reveal
certain themes of competence. While not exhaustive, those themes
include a consideration of the plausibility of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, its timing, and the possibility of the Court's entering a judi-
cious decision which actually contributes to a resolution of the un-
derlying dispute. The extent to which other organs of the United
Nations have a proper role to play in promoting a settlement of the
controversy is also a relevant factor. The threshhold consideration
is that of jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION BASED UPON CONSENT
The jurisdiction of the International Court in contentious cases is
based upon consent, 3 and doubts concerning jurisdiction must be
resolved with dispatch. Where the defendant state refuses to make
" Note 8 supra.
" See the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, Fisheries Jurisdiction, Merits, Judgment,
[19741 I.C.J. 127.
11 I.C.J. STATUTE art. 36.
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an appearance and contests the Court's competence, the need for an
expeditious resolution of the jurisdictional question is imperative.
Moreover, the Court must express its conviction that its authority
has been properly engaged. This is particularly true when the appli-
cant state requests interim measures of protection.
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil C. Case Judges Winiarski and Badawi
Pasha, in a joint dissenting opinion, calibrated the delicate nuances
of power and authority which are bound up with the problem of
jurisdictional competence:
In international law it is the consent of the parties which confers
jurisdicion on the Court; the Court has jurisdiction only in so far
as that jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties. The power
given to the Court by Article 41 is not unconditional; it is given
for the purposes of the proceedings and is limited to those proceed-
ings. If there is no jurisdiction as to the merits, there can be no
jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of protection. Measures
of this kind in international law are exceptional in character to an
even greater extent than they are in municipal law; they may
easily be considered a scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs
of a sovereign State. For this reason, too, the Court ought not to
indicate interim measures of protection unless its competence, in
the event of this being challenged, appears to the Court to be
nevertheless reasonably probable. Its opinion on this point should
be reached after a summary consideration; it can only be provi-
sional and cannot prejudge its final decision, after the detailed
consideration to which the Court will proceed in the course of
adjudicating on the question in conformity with all the Rules laid
down for its procedure.
We find it difficult to accept the view that if prima facie the total
lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not patent, that is, if there is a
possibility, however remote, that the Court may be competent
then it may indicate interim measures of protection. This ap-
proach, which also involves an element of judgment, and which
does not reserve to any greater extent the right of the Court to give
a final decision as to its jurisdiction, appears however to be based
on a presumption in favour of the competence of the Court which
is not in consonance with the principles of international law. In
order to accord with these principles, the position should be re-
versed: if there exist weighty arguments in favour of the challenged
jurisdiction, the Court may indicate interim measures of protec-
tion; if there exist serious doubts or weighty arguments against this
jurisdiction such measures cannot be indicated. 4
, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Interim Order (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89,
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Since the Anglo-Iranian Case in 1951, the International Court has
displayed a greater sensitivity to the degree of certitude required
when its jurisdiction is challenged. In granting the requests for in-
terim measures of protection in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases the
Court stated that while it need not be finally satisfied that it has
jurisdiction on the merits, it should not indicate provisional mea-
sures under article 41 of its Statute if the absence of jurisdiction is
manifest. It then concluded that the exchanges of notes expressly
providing for recourse to the Court provided, prima facie, "a possi-
ble basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded. '"'
In the Nuclear Tests Cases this standard was repeated when the
Court responded to a request of Australia and New Zealand for
interim orders directed against atmospheric nuclear weapon testing
by France in the Pacific Ocean. Jurisdiction was asserted by the
Applicants under article 33 of the General Act of 1928 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes. 6 In letters addressed to the
Registrar of the Court, France took the position that the Court was
manifestly not competent. It did not intend to appoint an agent,
and requested the Court to remove the case from its list. In its
decision granting the request for interim orders of protection, the
Court observed that it should not indicate such measures unless
"the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to
afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded . . . ."" It then summarized the conflicting views of the
parties with respect to the jurisdictional issue and decided that the
provisions invoked by the Applicants provided an adequate basis
upon which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded.
While there has been improvement upon the criteria for provi-
sional jurisdiction used by a majority of the Court in the Anglo-
Iranian Case, it is arguable that the present approach remains unsa-
tisfactory. Because the contentious jurisdiction is founded upon
state consent, a reasonable possibility that the Court may, in a
particular case, have jurisdiction can be an unauthorized step to-
wards compulsory jurisdiction. Where the vital interests of a state
form the basis of its refusal to participate in judicial proceedings, it
96. The majority in deciding upon interim measures had determined that the claim did not
fall completely outside the scope of international jurisdiction.
[19721 I.C.J. 12, para. 17.
" 93 L.N.T.S. 343, 357.
" Nuclear Tests, Interim Order (Australia v. France), [19731 I.C.J. 99, para. 17; (New
Zealand v. France) [1973] I.C.J. 135, para. 18 [references hereafter will be to Australia v.
France].
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is arguable that the Court must be clearly satisfied that it has
jurisdiction to adjudge on the merits, and that such a determination
must be made before the Court seriously exercises its authority. In
such a view, article 41 has no independent significance."
These considerations, although cogent, must be weighed against
the urgency of the need for granting interim relief to the applicant
state. In each particular case, countervailing factors must be care-
fully balanced. An awareness of these elements was expressed by
Judge Jimenez DeArechaga in a separate declaration in the interim
measures phase of the Nuclear Tests Cases:
I do not believe the Court should indicate interim measures with-
out paying due regard to the basic question of its jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the Application. A request should not be
granted if it is clear, even on a prima facie appreciation, that there
is no possible basis on which the Court could be competent as to
the merits. The question of jurisdiction is therefore one, and per-
haps the most important, among all relevant circumstances to be
taken into account by a Member of the Court when voting in
favour of or against a request for interim measures.
On the other hand, in view of the urgent character of the decision
on provisional measures, it is obvious that the Court cannot make
its answer dependent on a previous collective determination by
means of a judgment of the question of its jurisdiction on the
merits.
This situation places upon each Member of the Court the duty
to make, at this stage, an appreciation of whether-in the light of
the grounds invoked and of the other materials before him-the
Court will possess jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the dis-
pute. . . . One must be satisfied that this basic question of the
Court's jurisdiction has received the fullest possible attention
which one is able to give to it within the limits of time and of
materials available for the purpose.
When, as in this case, the Court decides in favour of interim
measures, and does not, as requested by the French Government,
remove the case from the list, the parties will have the opportunity
at a later stage to plead more fully on the jurisdictional question.
It follows that that question cannot be prejudged now; it is not
[1973] I.C.J. 99, 111 (Judge Forster, dissenting opinion). Compare the separate opinions
of Judge Morozov and Judge Mosler in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Order (Greece
v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3.
Article 41 provides that "Ithe court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party." I.C.J. STATUTE art. 41, para. 1.
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possible to exclude a priori that the further pleadings and other
relevant information may change views or convictions presently
held."9
There are also matters of timing which affect the question of
jurisdictional competence. After making a provisional determina-
tion that it may have jurisdiction on the merits the Court can set a
future date for the submission of Memorials and Counter-
Memorials devoted to the jurisdictional issue. In so doing, the Court
indicates its willingness to give the issue plenary consideration. It
is somewhat difficult to reconcile this procedure with the provisions
of article 53 of the Court's Statute dealing with the consequences
of default, 0 since by prolonging the resolution of the jurisdictional
issue the Court is postponing' its response to the nonappearance.
The defendant state may be prejudiced if the Memorials do not
address the merits, particularly if the Applicant state has the ad-
vantage of an appointment of an ad hoc judge.2
By deferring a final judgment on the question of jurisdictional
competence, the Court also provides the nonappearing state with
further opportunity to reverse its own decision and participate in
the proceedings. These implied invitations have in fact not been
accepted. This alone, however, does not invalidate the wisdom of
the strategy, for in asserting its authority by retention of jurisdic-
tion, the Court may be in a position to make a contribution to the
orderly disposition of international disputes. Of course, the danger
that retention of jurisdiction in spite of the persistent refusal of a
party to appear can detract from the Court's general authority does
remain. In recent cases the Court has been willing to take the risk.
Unfortunately the net results, in contentious cases, may have been
detrimental to the institutional stature of the Court.
III. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION UPON CONTEST
Retention of jurisdiction in spite of defiance by the respondent
state can be advantageous if circumstances arise which allow the
Court to terminate a tenuous involvement in a satisfactory manner.
,9 [19731 I.C.J. 99, 107. For a refinement of this view see the Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf Case, Order (Sept. 11, 1976), [1976] I.C.J. 3, 16. Compare H. LAUTERPACHT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT ch. 6 (1958).
20 Note 8 supra.
" See the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, in the Nuclear Tests, Interim Order (Australia
v. France), [19731 I.C.J. 99, 115. The order for submission of Memorials and Counter-
Memorials appears in [1973] I.C.J. 338 (Australia v. France) and [1973] I.C.J. 341 (New
Zealand v. France).
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The Case Concerning the Pakistani Prisoners of War is illustrative.
On May 11, 1973, Pakistan instituted proceedings against India
with respect to a dispute concerning Pakistani prisoners of war in
Indian custody. The Applicant asked the Court to indicate interim
measures of protection pending final decision. India declined to
consent to jurisdiction and explained why it felt that there was no
legal basis for the action. Hearings were scheduled but Pakistan
then notified the Court that it expected negotiations to commence
and asked the Court to postpone further consideration of its request
for interim measures in order to facilitate the negotiations. By its
decision of July 13, 1973,22 the Court explained that in view of the
suggestion of a postponement, the element of urgency requisite for
the issuance of interim orders was not present. It determined that
the Court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to entertain the
dispute. The Court further decided that written proceedings should
be first addressed to the jurisdictional issue, and set a time limit
of October 1 for the Memorial of Pakistan and December 15 for the
Counter-Memorial of India on that issue. It reserved the subsequent
procedure for further decision.
By its order of September 29, 1973,3 the Court granted an exten-
sion sought by Pakistan for the filing of Memorials and Counter-
Memorials. Although notified of the request, India had made no
reply. However, difficulties which might have arisen from India's
nonappearance were avoided in December when Pakistan informed
the Court that agreement had been reached on some phases of the
dispute and requested that, in order to further negotiations, the
Court officially discontinue the case. By its order of December 15,
1973,24 the Court removed the case from its list.
In the Prisoner of War Case, the Court assumed an authority over
an international dispute in spite of the defiance of the respondent
state. Postponing its final decision on the challenged jurisdiction,
it was not ultimately embarrassed by the nonappearance because it
had good reasons to strike the case from its lists. This established a
congruence between its action and the general processes of peaceful
settlement. 21
2 Case Concerning Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Request for the Indica-
tion of Interim Measures of Protection, [1973] I.C.J. 328.
- [1973] I.C.J. 344.
24 [1973] I.C.J. 347.
" But see the criticism of Judge Petren, dissenting, [1973] I.C.J. 328, 334. Retention of a
case may also be designed to allow for the development of jurisdiction forum prorogatum. See
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But judgment can be too long deferred, especially if the Court
issues orders which the recalcitrant state refuses to obey. In the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, Iceland sought to apply its fisheries
zone regulations in spite of the Court's interim order, and violence
occurred."6 Although the Court had decided the jurisdictional ques-
tion, it had not reached the merits. The reaffirmation of the interim
orders" under these circumstances accentuated the impotence of
the Court and probably demeaned its authority.
If the nonappearing state is adamant in its rejection of the Court's
authority, the jurisdictional issue must be resolved and some deci-
sion reached on the underlying controversy. The simplest result,
sanctioned by the Court's Statute, is a default judgment. While in
the cases under review the Court has ostensibly been guided by
article 53,26 it has not rigorously applied that provision. Aware that
these types of cases call for more than the formal exercise of adjudi-
catory powers, it has sought to resolve the underlying controversies
in a manner which will attract the assent of both the consenting and
nonconsenting parties.
The Court's handling of the fisheries controversy, while otherwise
subject to criticism,29 was, according to this measure, laudable. It
tried to take the legitimate interests of Iceland as well as those of
its antagonists into account, and it tailored its judgment to the
practical needs of further negotiations. Iceland had refused the ju-
risdiction of the Court, but had begun (in spite of violent interludes)
to reach a peaceful accommodation of its differences with Great
Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court took pains
to elaborate an equitable frame of reference for the negotiations
which would contribute to a final resolution of the controversy.
Where the nonconsenting state is not actively pursuing a resolu-
tion of the controversy by means other than adjudication, the posi-
tion of the Court is more precarious. It may provisionally resolve the
jurisdictional issue in favor of its competence, but because of the
prospect of certain defiance, it may be unwilling to render a judg-
ment on the merits. The somewhat puzzling decisions in the
H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT ch.
6, § 34 (1958).
" Fisheries Jurisdiction, Interim Measures, [1973] I.C.J. 302, 304 (Judge Ignacio-Pinto,
dissenting).
[19731 I.C.J. 302.
Note 8 supra.
' See sec. IV infra.
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Nuclear Tests Cases may be more comprehensible in light of these
difficulties.
In its judgments of December 20, 1974,30 the Court by a 9-6 vote
held that the claims of Australia and New Zealand no longer had
any object and therefore the Court need not give decision. The Ap-
plicants needed an assurance or undertaking by France that it
would not conduct further nuclear tests at its Pacific Center, and
the public statements made by the President of France and other
high French officials were interpreted as creating a binding obliga-
tion not to conduct further atmospheric tests. 3' The rationale was
ingenious, but not convincing. The provisional orders, blatantly vio-
lated by France, lapsed. Should France violate the undertaking,
provision was made for for the reappearance of the Applicants; yet
if France should decide that its national interests required a re-
sumption of atmospheric nuclear tests, the Court would be placed
in a very awkward if not impossible position. The total impression
was that the Court was groping for a means of exit and the decision
lacked the sense of suitability which one could perceive in the termi-
nation of the Prisoner of War Case.
Did the circumstances call for a final determination of the juris-
dictional issue and a decision on the merits? The Applicants had
asked for a decision that the conduct of France was not consistent
with international law, a request that could have been met with a
Declaratory Judgment. Such a decision would have been more con-
sistent with the judicial function. With the legal relations between
the parties defined in a manner consonant with the genuine contro-
versy, it would then have remained for the states to draw for them-
" Nuclear Tests, Judgment (Australia v. France), [19741 I.C.J. 253; (New Zealand v.
France), [1974] I.C.J. 457.
3' The Court remarked:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Decla-
rations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of
the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertak-
ing, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and
with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of interna-
tional negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a
quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply
or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since
such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the
juridical act by which the pronouncement by, the State was made.
[19731 I.C.J. 253, 267.
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selves whatever appropriate conclusions should be drawn from the
decision22 But while this appears to be a preferable resolution, it
contains questionable assumptions about applicable law. The rele-
vant conventional norms, such as those in the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty,33 were not applicable to France. And it would probably not
have been appropriate to extend the principle of the Trail Smelter
Arbitration34 to the testing of weapons which sovereign states feel
are neccessary for their defense, at least in the absence of a broad
consensus concerning responsibility for the consequences.
In the Fisheries Cases, by contrast, the Court based the adjudica-
tory phase of its decision upon a general principle proscribing uni-
lateral state action, one which the Court has previously applied and
which was reflected in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas. However, whether the Court's opinion in the Fisheries Cases
was in its entirety a judicious exercise of power is more difficult to
determine. There the Court was assuming an authority to enforce
the obligations of pacific settlement provided in article 33 of the
U.N. Charter.5 Moreover, in balancing the respective interests, it
refused to take account of developments in the law of the sea favora-
ble to Iceland's position. To better understand the significance of
these factors it may be useful to examine more closely the phenome-
non of parallel competence.
IV. JUDICIAL COMPETENCE IN LIGHT OF EMERGING NORMS
In the general flow of decisions which we are examining, many of
the underlying controversies fall within the province of different
32 See the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez DeArechaga, and
Sir Humphrey Waldock, 11974] I.C.J. 253, 312.
'0 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, done Aug. 5, 1963 (Moscow), [19631 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43 (entered into force for the United States Oct. 19, 1963). France is not a party to the Treaty.
I Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938,
1941): "[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. at 1965. Compare Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transna-
tional Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975) with Elkind, Footnote to the Nuclear Test Cases:
Abuse of Right-A Blind Alley for Environmentalists, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57 (1976).
For an analysis of the majority opinion in the Nuclear Test Cases, see Ed. Comment, 69 AM.
J. INT'L L. 612 (1975).
u "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para.
1.
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parts of the United Nations system. They involve some relationship
between the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, and other organs or activities of the organization which
perform dispute settlement and law-creating functions. Where a
case before the Court involves matters of fundamental change, poli-
cies may be emerging in another forum which may conflict with the
legal norms appropriate for judicial decision. In the Fisheries Juris-
diction Cases reference was made to proposals for the expansion of
coastal state jurisdiction then under consideration by the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Court char-
acterized these proposals as the aspirations of states rather than as
the expression of principles of existing law. 3 As a court of law, the
Court could not enter a judgment sub specie legis ferendae.
In the adjudicatory phase of the Fisheries decision, the Court's
position was essentially correct. Passing judgment upon the com-
patibility of a state's action with existing law preserved the unique-
ness of the judicial function. In periods when legal norms are being
transformed, the Court retains its integrity by applying the law as
it is, rather than engaging in judicial lawmaking.37 Nor was the
Court unfair to the respondent state.
The Court did not declare that the extension of fisheries jurisdic-
tion was invalid erga omnes; it only sought to proscribe the unilat-
eral assertion of coastal state competence. By having recourse to the
Court, the Applicant states were insisting upon acquired rights, and
this strategy was probably a source of friction. But an impartial
decision based upon existing law can be conducive to final settle-
ment, as it can be a starting point 'for accommodations. 3 Con-
versely, a denial of an existing right, coupled with a refusal to sub-
mit the claim to impartial resolution, can freeze negotiation posi-
tions and preclude the spirit of accommodation.
These considerations tend to support the Court's judgment in the
Fisheries Cases. But, as the full decision is taken into account,
justifications for the Court's action tend to diminish because the
Court also asserted an authority to dictate the general structure of
subsequent negotiations between the parties. It reasoned that the
preferential rights of the coastal state had to be reconciled with the
11 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, Merits, Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 3, para. 53.
31 See Gross, The International Court of Justice and the United Nations 120 RECUEIL DES
COURS 313, 431 (1967-I).
Compare H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ch.
XVI, § 38 (1966).
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historical rights of the Applicants based upon traditional fishing,
and that such an adjustment could only be achieved through good
faith bargaining. Negotiations were integral to the proper solution
of the controversy.
The Court's directive orders concerning the framework of negotia-
tion was arguably within the adjudicatory authority considered as
a general participation in the peaceful settlement of disputes.39
While noting that it could not preclude the parties from taking
advantage of subsequent developments in the rules of international
law, the Court imposed upon the parties the obligation to take into
account the Court's determination, based upon existing law, of the
respective rights of both the Applicants and the respondent state in
the disputed area." Given the rapid changes now being experienced
in the area of the law of the sea, it was probably unwise for the Court
to so extend its authority.
The disparity between the emerging regime of coastal state juris-
diction and the Court's judgment has become so significant that the
developments in the law have virtually displaced the Court's orders
regarding negotiations. Several states, including Iceland, have now
extended their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. 1 These changes
reflect the concept of an exclusive economic zone which is under
consideration by the Law of the Sea Conference. The legal relation-
ship conceived by the Court has been substantially altered because
the emerging norms upset the delicate balance of rights which was
integral to its judgment. The working drafts under consideration by
the Law of the Sea Conference would eliminate freedom of fishing
within the economic zone and substitute therefor coastal state sov-
ereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and
management of living resources. 2 This not only extends coastal
19 See the separate opinion of Judge DeCastro in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, Merits,
Judgment, [19741 I.C.J. 3, 72, where it is argued that once the Court had declared that it
had jurisdiction, it should not leave the dispute open, but rather actively seek a solution.
[1974] I.C.J. 3, paras. 73-78.
See Regulations Concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland, July 15, 1975, reprinted in
14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1282 (1975); Mexican Federal Law on Exclusive Economic Zone,
reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 382 (1976); United States Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. Pocket Part 1977).
42 Article 45(1)(a) of the Law of the Sea Informal Single Negotiating Text, pt. II (Second
Committee Text), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 710, 721-22 (1975), provides as follows:
In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State has
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether renewable or non-
renewable, of the bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters . . ..
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state authority; it drastically alters the relationship between the
coastal state and foreign fisheries. Coastal state sovereignty is sub-
stituted for freedom of fishing, and, while the emerging law recog-
nizes some legitimate interests of foreign fishing,4" they are subject
to the discretion of the coastal state. The reciprocities no longer fit
into the Court's framework. This affects a change in the bargaining
position of the parties, which is reflected in agreements reached
between the adversaries in the Fisheries Cases.4
V. PARALLEL COMPETENCE OF OTHER U.N. FoRA
The Court's involvement in the processes of dispute settlement
was ineffective in the Fisheries Cases not only because of changing
patterns of state practice, but also because a different policy was
being established within another United Nations arena. However,
where another organ of the United Nations actively invokes the
jurisdiction of the Court, it can provide an opportunity for the Court
to contribute to the settlement of a serious dispute. In such an
event, the Court may be able to assert its authority in spite of the
objection of one of the parties to the underlying controversy. The
controversy surrounding the decolonization of the Western Sahara
provided such an opportunity for positive collaboration between
different organs of the United Nations.
By its Resolution 3292 (XXIX)45 the General Assembly requested
the International Court to give an advisory opinion as to whether
the Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of Spanish coloni-
zation and, if not, to determine the nature of the legal ties between
,1 Where the coastal state does not possess the capacity to harvest the allowable catch, it
would be obliged to give other states access to the surplus. Id. art. 51(2), reprinted in 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'Ls 710, 724 (1975). The Mexican Law on Fisheries Development, article 37, as
amended, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 385 (1976), excludes commercial fishing in the
economic zone by foreign vessels, but allows for permits to be issued in "exceptional cases"
when the total allowable catch of a particular species exceeds the fishing capacity of national
vessels. See also United States Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1811, 1821-25 (Supp. Pocket Part 1977). This Act has an effective date of March
1, 1977, and provides for power of amendment if the United States ratifies a comprehensive
Law of the Sea Treaty. Id. §§ 1811n., 1881. See generally Stevenson & Oxman, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L
L. 763, 778-81 (1975).
11 Fisheries Agreement between Iceland and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to
the Extension of the Icelandic Fishery Limits to 200 Nautical Miles, done Nov. 28, 1975
(Reykjavik), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 43 (1976); Agreement (Exchange of Notes)
Concerning British Fishing in Icelandic Waters, June 1, 1976 (Oslo), [1976] Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 73 (Cmd. 6545), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 878 (1976).
'1 G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 103, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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that territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian
entity. As a judge of Spanish nationality was a member of the Court,
Morocco requested the appointment of an ad hoc judge under article
31 of the Statute of the Court.4" Mauritania, referring to the recogni-
tion of its interest in the question by the General Assembly, in-
formed the Court of its intention to choose a person to sit as judge,
ad hoc in the proceedings.
In its initial order of May 22, 1975,11 the Court, by ten votes to
five, found that Morocco was entitled under articles 31 and 68 of the
Statute, and article 89 of the Rules of Court, to choose a person to
sit as judge ad hoc.4" By a vote of 8-7, it held that the requirements
of the relevant articles and rules were not satisfied as to Mauri-
tania. " The majority reasoned that at the time Resolution 3292 was
adopted there appeared to be a legal dispute between Morocco and
Spain regarding the Western Sahara territory. In the language of
article 89 of the Court rules, the advisory opinion appears to be one
''upon a legal question actually pending between two or more
states."'" As for Mauritania, the majority held that these conditions
were not met. The decision was without prejudice to the locus standi
of any interested state in regard to any matters raised in the pro-
ceedings.
Following the General Assembly's request for an expeditious deci-
sion, the Court, after inviting Members of the United Nations to
take part in the oral proceedings,5 held public hearings in June and
July, and announced its advisory opinion on October 16, 1975.52 In
its opinion it responded to Spain's observation that the advisory
jurisdiction was being used to circumvent the principle of consent
to adjudication.
Spanish counsel referred to statements made by King Hassan II
of Morocco in September 1974 proposing the joint submission by
Spain and Morocco to the International Court of the question as to
whether the Western Sahara was res nullius. Spain argued that the
,1 "If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties,
any other party may choose a person to sit as judge." I.C.J. STATUTE art. 31, para. 2.
[1975] I.C.J. 6.
, Id. at 8. Article 68 provides that in the exercise of its advisory functions, "the Court
shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious
cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable." I.C.J. STATUTE art. 68.
,0 [19751 I.C.J. 6,8.
The Rules of the Court, as amended May 10, 1972, are found in I.C.J. ACTS AND
DocuMENrrs, No. 2 (1972).
Algeria and Zaire were also represented at the public hearings.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. 12.
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subject of the questions raised in the request for the advisory opin-
ion were substantially identical with those which it had refused to
submit to the Court for resolution in a contentious proceeding. Con-
sequently, to give a reply to the request for an advisory opinion
would
[b]e to allow the advisory procedure to be used as a means of
bypassing the consent of a State, which constitutes the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction. If the Court were to countenance such a use
of its advisory jurisdiction, the outcome would be to obliterate the
distinction between the two spheres of the Court's jurisdiction and
the fundamental principle of the independence of states would be
affected, for states would find their disputes with other states
being submitted to the Court, by this indirect means, without their
consent; this might result in compulsory jurisdiction being
achieved by majority vote in a political organ. Such circumvention
of the well-established principle of consent for the exercise of inter-
national jurisdiction would constitute. . . a compelling reason for
declining to answer the request.53
The Court acknowledged that the discretionary nature of its advi-
sory jurisdiction would allow it to decline to give an opinion if, under
the circumstances, the fundamental principle of state consent
would be violated. But it held that this was not such a case. The
Status of Eastern Carelia Case,54 which was favorable to the Spanish
position, was distinguishable. There the Permanent Court had dec-
lined to give an advisory opinion requested by the Council of the
League of Nations which concerned a dispute between Finland and
Russia. As it was not then a member of the League, Russia was not
bound by any of the methods of pacific settlement provided for in
the Covenant to which it did not give express consent. In the present
instance Spain, as a member of the United Nations, had accepted
the Charter and Statute; it had given general consent to the exercise
by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court was
not giving its opinion to the states, but to the organ which had
requested it. The request involved a legal controversy, but one
which arose within the General Assembly in relation to matters with
which the Assembly was legitimately concerned. The objective was
to guide that organ in the discharge of its responsibilities to the
process of decolonization in the disputed territory.5 This assured
5 Id. at 22-23.
[19231 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5.
[1975] I.C.J. 12, paras. 30-42. Reference was also made to the Peace Treaty Case,
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that the Court, in giving its opinion, was not circumventing the
principles of sovereignty by indirectly resolving a particular dispute
to which one of the parties has not consented.
The Court was able to assert its authority over a legal controversy
in spite of the objection of one of the parties, because it was able to
justify its jurisdiction in terms of its responsibility to another organ
of the United Nations system. This coordination also enabled the
Court to place contentions between the parties which were highly
political in character into a broader legal perspective. In the contro-
versy between Spain and Morocco, no issue was raised as to the
legitimacy of Spain's original occupation of Western Sahara. Thus,
the first question presented in the request for the advisory opin-
ion-whether the territory was res nullius at the time of the occupa-
tion-appeared to be a matter of historical interest with no appar-
ent relation to contemporary legal relations. This created an initial
difficulty because judicial power, even in advisory proceedings, can
only be exercised with reference to the existence of rights and obliga-
tions in international law.
The differences between Spain and Morocco related to procedures
for implementing decolonization in the disputed area. It was the
position of Morocco that at the time of colonization it was exercising
sovereign authority in the area. Mauritania was contending that
during the period in question ties of allegiance existed between the
nomadic tribes in the Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity.
These conflicting positions, reflected in the second question submit-
ted by the General Assembly, had a contemporary juridical signifi-
cance.
Both Morocco and Mauritania claimed that the Western Sahara
was part of their territory. Such assertions had to be reconciled with
the principle of self-determination of peoples. Thus principles of
decolonization, as articulated in prior General Assembly resolu-
tions, were an indispensible source of law:
[T]he applicable principles of decolonization call for examination
by the Court in that they are an essential part of the framework of
the questions contained in the request. The reference in those
questions to a historical period cannot be understood to fetter or
hamper the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions. That
[1950] I.C.J. 72. For an analysis of the erosion of the Eastern Carelia precedent, see Gross,
The International Court of Justice and the United Nations, 120 RECUEIL DES CouRs 313, 359-
370 (1967-I).
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would not be consistent with the Court's judicial character; for in
the exercise of its functions it is necessarily called upon to take into
account existing rules of international law which are directly con-
nected with the terms of the request and indispensible for the
proper interpretation and understanding of its opinion.56
By placing the diverse contentions within the total context of deco-
lonization, the Court was able to affirm the normative status of
United Nations resolutions on the self-determination of non-self-
governing peoples" and related these principles to the substance of
the controversy. While it found that both Morocco and the Mauri-
tanian entity had legal ties in the disputed area at the time of
Spanish occupation, they were not ties of territorial sovereignty. It
further determined that the interests of these states cannot be op-
posed to the principle of self-determination through the free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples in the territory."s
By viewing the dispute as part of the decolonization process, and
in subordinating the interests of states to the values of self-
determination, the Court made an admirable use of its judicial au-
thority. But some doubts can be raised as to whether the Court
acted with complete consistency. The Court determined that con-
sent to jurisdiction was unnecessary because the matter submitted
to it was not a territorial dispute between Spain and Morocco. Since
the proceeding was not of an adversarial character, it decided that
normal rules on burdens of proof would be inapplicable. Yet the
parties argued their positions strenuously, as they were compelled
to do if their interests were to be adequately represented. And the
Court, rather than pursuing an independent investigation, relied
upon the proofs presented and made choices between competing
' Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975 I.C.J. 12, para. 52. But see the separate
opinion of Judge Petren, [1975] I.C.J. 104, which asserts that the issues are only historical.
11 Reliance was placed upon the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV) and Res. 1541(XV), providing for the choices
available to non-self-governing territories upon the achievement of independence. [1975]
I.C.J. 12, 23. See generally G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1961); G.A. Res. 1541, id. at 29.
[1975] I.C.J. 12, para. 162. G.A. Res. 1514, para. 6 provides:
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.
15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1971). The claims of former legal
ties advanced by Morocco and Mauritania bear upon this standard. The underlying problem
was to reconcile the right of self-determination with the principle of national unity. [1975]
I.C.J. 104,110 (Judge Petren, separate opinion); [1975] I.C.J. 78 (Judge Ignacio-Pinto). See
also Emerson, Self Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
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interpretations of the material presented.
The advisory opinion was also incongruous with the earlier judg-
ment concerning the appointment of ad hoc judges. In its advisory
opinion, the Court addressed itself to the arguments of both Mo-
rocco and Mauritania concerning their interests in the disputed
area. These interests were, at least partially, adverse. 9 In its prelim-
inary order the Court, by an 8-7 vote, had refused Mauritania's
request for an ad hoc judge on the grounds that there was not an
adversarial relation between it and Spain. That judgment was tech-
nically correct, but was not responsive to the actual tenor of the
underlying controversy as later revealed by the advisory opinion.
More serious questions can be raised concerning the limited na-
ture of the advisory opinion. Having given its opinion upon the basis
of the supremacy of the principle of self-determination over claims
based upon territorial integrity, the Court determined that the
rights flowing from these principles have a bearing upon the scope
and quality of the General Assembly's supervisory power. Yet the
Court was careful not to limit the options available to the General
Assembly as it fulfilled its responsibilities in the decolonization pro-
cess. It was sufficient for the Court to give its opinion to the Assem-
bly based upon the law, without deciding what effect the opinion
might have upon its future actions.10 Here the Court's position
might be criticized on the grounds that it was an insufficient contri-
bution to the effective and lawful settlement of the decolonization
dispute.
The Court, under the present circumstances of international rela-
tions, is in a difficult position, given the general resistance of states
to its authority. Its ability to contribute to the peaceful settlement
of disputes is precarious; in cases of which it is seized, it must make
a careful judgment about the practical limits of its competence. We
have already noted how judicial activism can detract from the
Court's authority. But while the Court must be circumspect, there
are circumstances which call for it to be bold. It is submitted that
in the Western Sahara Case the Court should have taken a stronger
11 [19751 I.C.J. 12, paras. 89, 102. There was division within the Court concerning whether
such interests were capable of legal determination, since they were based upon forms of
allegiance unfamiliar to Western societies. See the discussion in Judge Dillard's separate
opinion, [1975] I.C.J. 116, 125-126. Tension between advisory competence and the judicial
function can also be seen in Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, [1973] I.C.J. 166.
- [1975] I.C.J. 12, paras. 72-73.
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position with respect to the ultimate disposition of the decoloniza-
tion controversy.
Since the time of the advisory opinion, the General Assembly has
not exercised an effective authority over the process of self-
determination. Following the so-called "Green March" into the
Saharan territory, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, on November
14, 1975,61 concluded a tripartite agreement providing for the termi-
nation of Spanish presence and the establishment of a temporary
tripartite administration to which Spain would transfer its author-
ity as administering power. The new administration, consisting of
Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania would collaborate with an assem-
bly which would ostensibly represent the views of the Saharan popu-
lation. By its resolutions of December 10, 1975, the General Assem-
bly sought to balance its responsibility to assure respect for the
principle of self-determination with a recognition of the tripartite
agreement and its consequences. Spain, as the administering power,
was requested to assure that "all Saharans . . . may exercise fully
and freely, under United Nations supervision, their inalienable right
to self-determination," 62 while the interim administration was re-
quested to assure the same objective, "through free consultations
organized with the assistance of a representative of the United Na-
tions appointed by the Secretary General. 6 3
While the ultimate political status of Western Sahara remains
undetermined, it clear that political events have been manipulated
by Morocco and Mauritania so as to thwart United Nations supervi-
sion over the process of self-determination and to divide the area in
a manner consistent with their interests. On February 26, 1976,
Spain withdrew from the Western Sahara, to avoid responsibility for
a pending vote by the National Assembly which Spain charged was
being controlled by Morocco and Mauritania. 4 These states invited
the Secretary General to send an observer, which he declined to do
on the grounds that the proceedings were not in conformity with
General Assembly resolutions. 5 On February 27, the Assembly
61 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Dec. 1975, at 8.
62 G.A. Res. 3458(A), 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 116, 117, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
G.A. Res. 3458(B), id. at 117. See U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1976, at 38.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
'5 At a press conference on Feb. 26, Secretary General Waldheim referred to his refusal to
send an observer:
There was no way of acting differently if I want to stick to the existing resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly, even taking into account that we had two resolu-
tions and that those two resolutions were contradictory in a number of aspects. But
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voted to ratify the annexation of the territory by Morocco and
Mauritania. 8
The Court could not have prevented these results, but if it had
been more explicit about the rights of the inhabitants, the contemp-
tuous parties might have felt a greater restraint. If it is "for the
people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory
the destiny of the people,""7 the Court should have shown a greater
solicitude for that ideal. It would have been appropriate for the
Court to affirm fully the rights of the inhabitants, and to have made
the options open to the people of the territory an explicit part of its
opinion."6
VI. CONCLUSION - THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION
The effective exercise of judicial authority by the International
Court of Justice is dependent upon the good will, restraint, and
cooperation of states whose international actions are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. It is important that member states feel
bound by the methods and procedures provided by the Charter for
the peaceful settlement of disputes. But it is equally important that
the nonjudicial organs of the United Nations encourage and imple-
ment those pacific objectives. The Western Sahara situation dimin-
ished the Court's authority, not because of its incompetence, but
because its advisory opinion was not followed with appropriate ac-
tion by the General Assembly.
The inaction of United Nations organs can be significant in other
cases where the Court's jurisdiction over a particular dispute is
challenged and its authority is defied. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Cases, Iceland, the respondent state, had denied the Court's compe-
tence to deal with disputes arising from the extension of its fisheries
zone. Nevertheless, the Court issued interim orders of protection
which provided, inter alia, that none of the parties should take an
action that would aggravate the dispute, and that Iceland should
refrain from attempting to enforce its new fisheries regulations
they had one element in common: the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-
determination.
U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Mar. 1976, at 42.
" N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1976, at 6, col. 2. At the same time, a popular front movement,
aided by Algeria, proclaimed the establishment of a Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. A
guerilla war followed. See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1976, at 4, col. 3.
"[1975] I.C.J. 116, 122 (separate opinion, Judge Dillard).
" See [1975] I.C.J. 78, 80, in which Judge Nagendra Singh advocated this position in his
separate declaration.
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against vessels registered in the applicant states. Notice of these
measures was given to the parties and to the Security Council as
required by article 41 of the Court's Statute. 9
In May of 1973, violent clashes occurred in the disputed waters.
In letters to the President of the Security Council, formal com-
plaints were made by the representatives of Great Britain and Ice-
land: the former charging a violation of the Interim Order, the latter
charging an act of aggression in violation of article 39 of the
Charter.7" No action was taken by the Council. Great Britain then
requested the International Court to confirm its interim measures
of protection. Although Iceland repeated its protest against the
Court's jurisdiction, the Court, on July 12, 1973, confirmed the in-
terim orders7 and decided that, subject to provisions for amend-
ment, they should remain in effect until final judgment.
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, the Court had decided that it
had jurisdiction to entertain the applications" and deal with the
merits before complaints of violations of the interim orders were
made to the Security Council.73 Moreover, the changing character
of relevant norms undoubtedly had a bearing upon the Council's
silence. Yet the circumstances clearly called for some institutional
coordination. The Court could not have threatened the respondent
state with the sanction of default.7" And support from the Council
was needed to assist the fulfillment of the judicial function.
It is arguable that member states have an obligation to comply
with provisional orders of the Court so long as they are not based
upon a manifestly erroneous jurisdiction. Such compliance, which
is a general principle of civilized legal systems,7" may be included
" "Pending the final decision, notice of the [interim] measures suggested shall forthwith
be given to the parties and to the Security Council." I.C.J. STATUTE art. 41, para. 2.
10 Report of the Security Council, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 2) 149, U.N. Doc. A/9002
(1973).
" [1973] I.C.J. 302.
72 [1973] I.C.J. 3.
11 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, [19731 I.C.J. 306, 307, which quotes a state-
ment made by the British Government in the House of Commons on June 12, 1973.
1, Article 61 of the Rules of the Court, as amended May 10, 1972, does not contain any
provision for judicial sanction in case of noncompliance of a party with an interim measure
of protection. I.C.J. AcTs AND DOCUMENTS, No. 2 (1972). Rule 57 of the Rules of March 24,
1922, provided that "any refusal by the parties to conform to the suggestions of the Court or
of the President with regard to [interim] measures shall be placed on record." See also S.
ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ch. IV, §29 (1957). The Corfu Channel Case
(Great Britain v. Albania), Assessment of Compensation, [1949] I.C.J. 244, involved a
default for failure of appearance and failure to submit Counter-Memorials.
11 The classic United States casq is Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922). See also Walker
v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The municipal analogy is distinguishable in that
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within the scope of article 94 of the Charter."6 Moreover, as Lauter-
pacht observed, it should not be assumed that the Statute of the
Court, which is a legal instrument, refers only to moral obligations."
As article 41(2) of the Court's Statute provides that notice of
interim orders be given to the Security Council,7" it would be unrea-
sonable to assume that that organ could not take cognizance of
violent disobedience of such orders. While the imposition of sanc-
tions may not have been appropriate, some corporate expression of
disapproval would have been within the Council's power. As it is
authorized by chapter VI of the Charter to promote the peaceful
settlement of disputes," the Council could have admonished both
parties to refrain from further confrontation. It might also have
reminded them of the Charter principle that reference to the Inter-
national Court of Justice is the preferred means of resolving legal
disputes."
In two other contentious cases which we have reviewed, the
Nuclear Tests Cases and the Case Concerning Pakistani Prisoners
of War, the Council was notified of the interim measures of protec-
tion indicated by the Court. The Western Sahara controversy came
it assumes that an erroneous jurisdiction can be corrected on appeal. The distinction should
not, however, be considered decisive, since it states a principle of general order.
11 "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para.
1. See S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ch. IV, § 29 (1957).
17 H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
ch. 16, § 80 (1958). Lauterpacht concedes that the language of article 41 of the Statute
"precludes any confident affirmation of the binding force of the measures issued ... under
that Article." Kelsen states that the wording of that article "makes it difficult to interpret
Article 41 to mean that the Court may impose upon the contesting parties the obligation to
comply with provisional measures ordered by the Court .... " H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 538 (1964). This however, would not preclude the obligation from arising
from another source, such as art. 94 of the Charter, or from a general duty of membership in
the United Nations. Cf. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. 12, para. 30, where
the Court observes that Spain as a member of the United Nations has given in general its
consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction.
" Note 69 supra.
Viewing the Council's authority from this source is compatible with the understanding
that interim orders do not come within the powers conferred upon the Security Council by
article 94(2) of the Charter, which expressly refers to judgments of the Court:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may . . . make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.
U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2; Compare the discussion of the Anglo-Iranian Case before the
Council in S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE ch. IV, § 37 (1957).
" U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 3. The utility of this procedure might be challenged because
the subject matter was under discussion by the Law of the Sea Conference.
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before the Council because of the so-called "Green March" into the
Western Sahara by Morocco following the announcement of the
Court's advisory opinion in October 1975. By its Resolution 380
(1975) of November 6, 1975,1 the Council called upon Morocco to
withdraw all the participants from that territory. It also called upon
all parties concerned, without prejudice to any action which the
General Assembly might take, to cooperate with the Secretary Gen-
eral in trying to find a peaceful solution."s
The authority of the Court was only indirectly involved in this
incident. The Court had not adjudicated an international dispute
between Morocco and Spain, the administering power. Nor was
Morocco disobeying an order of the Court. The advisory opinion did
not legally bind anyone. But the Moroccan action was plainly con-
trary to the Court's finding that it had not established sovereign
authority in the disputed area prior to colonization. The ultimate
outcome of the Western Sahara affair was marked by contempt for
both the Court and the General Assembly. It was an outcome which
the Security Council should have foreseen and used its authority to
prevent. By failing to insist upon principles of self-determination
articulated by the Assembly and confirmed by the Court, the Coun-
cil compromised its position and failed to fully meet its responsibili-
ties.
In the recent Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case3 the failure of
coordination between the Court and the Security Council was com-
pounded by the actions of the parties. On August 10, 1976, Greece
filed proceedings in the Registry of the Court against Turkey in
respect of a dispute concerning the continental shelf appertaining
to those two states in the Aegean Sea. The application included a
request for interim measures of protection. On the same day, the
Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations re-
quested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the
alleged violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece on its
continental shelf in the Aegean. With the participation of the repre-
sentatives of both Greece and Turkey, the Council discussed the
question at meetings held on the 12th, 13th and 25th of August. On
August 25, the Council adopted Resolution 39584 which appealed to
Al S.C. Res. 380, 30 U.N. SCOR Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1975,
at 9, U.N. Doc. S/JNF/31 (1976).
" U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Dec. 1975, at 8.
[1976] I.C.J. 3.8S.C. Res. 395 (Aug. 25, 1976), reprinted in 15 INTr'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1235 (1976).
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the two governments to exercise restraint and to do all in their power
to reduce tensions in the area and resume direct negotiations.
In the meantime the Court had notified both parties of its inten-
tion to hold public hearings, commencing on August 25, which
would afford them the opportunity of presenting their observations
on the Greek request for interim measures. By letter dated August
25, received by the Court on the 26th, the Turkish Government
submitted its observation that the application of Greece was prema-
ture and that the Court lacked jurisdiction. It requested that the
Court remove the case from the list and it refused to appoint an
agent to represent it before the Court.
After holding hearings at which only Greece was represented, the
Court, on September 11, 1976, entered its order denying the request
for interim measures of protection. It held that there was insuffi-
cient risk of irremediable prejudice to the Applicant's rights to jus-
tify the exercise of its power under article 41 of the Statute.5 With
reference to the claim of Greece that interim measures were neces-
sary to prevent the aggravation of the dispute, the Court took notice
of the parallel proceedings before the Security Council. Referring to
Resolution 395 and its call for the peaceful settlement of the dis-
pute, and assuming the parties' compliance with its terms, the
Court found it unnecessary to consider whether it had an indepen-
dent power under article 41 of the Statute to indicate interim mea-
sures of protection solely to prevent aggravation.
The Court, in deferring to the Council, underscored the authority
of that United Nations organ; but the support was not mutual. The
Council had, in its resolution, made reference to the pending judi-
cial proceedings, but in terms so vague and unsubstantial" as to be
practically meaningless. The Council members may not have been
aware of the intentions of the Turkish Government to defy the
Court, but they could have encouraged a more responsible posture
if, in their resolution, they had expressly recognized the Court's
right to determine its own jurisdiction. After its decision of Septem-
ber 11, the Court followed its usual practice of entering a subsequent
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Order (Sept. 11, 1976), [1976] I.C.J. 3. For the
text of article 41, see notes 18, 69 supra.
In the final paragraph of Resolution 395, the Council
Invites the Governments of Greece and Turkey. . . to take into account the contri-
bution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of
Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences
which they may identify in connection with their present dispute.
15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1235 (1976).
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order on the question of jurisdiction. 7 The order, while logical and
necessary, simply exaggerates the Court's embarrassment as it pro-
ceeds to determine its jurisdiction where one party to the conflict
has denounced that jurisdiction in advance.
If major international disputes are to be settled upon the basis of
law and orderly procedure, greater account must be taken of the
interdependence which exists between the various principal organs
of the United Nations. Should present trends continue, the Court's
competence to deal with serious controversies will be continually
challenged by states whose interests are affected by the assumption
of judicial authority. On its own behalf, the Court must exercise a
creative and judicious wisdom comparable to the challenge. But the
Court is especially vulnerable to the arbitrariness of state sover-
eignty. It can fulfill its mission only when its actions gain support
from other components of the United Nations which have related
responsibilities. Without such mutual support, the possibilities for
the Court to make a constructive and effective contribution to the
peaceful settlement of disputes will go into a deeper and more seri-
ous decline.
17 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Order (Oct. 14, 1976), [19761 I.C.J. 42. (Fixing time
limits for submission of Memorials and Counter-Memorials.)
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